After a couple of months of grad school application hell, I’ve been wanting to get back to regular blogging, and under the influence of a couple of friends who are more productive than I am, I’ve decided to ease myself back into the blagosphere with a quasi-personal post or two about what I hope to achieve in philosophy and the place that I see for myself in the discipline that I love. In particular, I want to get to that point by first discussing a few philosophers that have influenced me greatly, and what I see as the reasons behind the somewhat chilly reception they’ve received in contemporary mainstream analytic philosophy.
Given that one of the reasons I’ve not posted for a while is that I have a tendency to write excessively long posts, I’m going to try to limit myself to shorter posts in order to encourage posting more frequently. As such, I want to begin today simply by explaining who it is that I’ve been most influenced by, and what I see as the commonalities and significance of their ideas.
Let’s begin with a few names, in no particular order: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Charles Travis, James Conant, J.L. Austin, Avner Baz, John McDowell, Stanley Cavell.
Whilst these philosophers write on a number of disparate, seemingly unrelated topics—semantics, Kierkegaard, epistemology, literature, aesthetics, psychology, Kant, and ancient philosophy, just to name a few—they all share one common characteristic: they all deviate, in one way or another, from the dominant methodological paradigm operative in much contemporary analytic philosophy.
Some caveats are already required before even this simple and vague statement can be said to be true. In particular, I don’t think there is an agreed-upon, universally-accepted ‘paradigm’ that governs mainstream philosophical practice. That being said, to borrow a Wittgensteinian term of art, there is enough of a family resemblance between most philosophers working within the mainstream for the contrast with these other philosophers to be meaningful.
Given that I don’t want to define this mainstream quasi-paradigm using any positive characteristics, and to indicate the wide range of approaches that fall within this broad category, it seems best to simply list, in a similar fashion, those philosophers I take to fall within this framework in some sense or another, and hope that some sense of their difference from the philosophers above will be evident to those familiar with contemporary philosophy: Saul Kripke, Tim Williamson, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, John Searle, David Lewis, Ned Block, Jerry Fodor, Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim.
Whilst I don’t think there are any hard-and-fast rules to follow to distinguish the two groups, nor any points on which the members of each group would all agree, I do think there are at least points on which every member of the two groups would disagree with each other (I’m not sure if natural language quantification is up to the challenge of expressing what I just tried to say, but I trust you get the point!), specifically regarding their understanding of the nature of philosophical problems, and the means by which they go about to solve them.
In particular, all of the philosophers in the first list fall under a rubric we could, without too much violence (and with the notable exception of McDowell, who I’ll deal with elsewhere), call “ordinary language philosophy”. To be less vague, all the philosophers named share, in one sense or another, the conviction that any investigation of phenomena interesting to philosophers—art, perception, reality, meaning—must proceed first and foremost through a careful investigation of the meanings of the terms in question, paying particular attention to the use that we put these words to.
This outline requires much more detail than I’ve currently given it, but in the spirit of keeping these posts short, sharp, and to the point, I’m going to finish up here and leave this exposition to future posts. However, I’d like to close with a few quotations from some of the philosophers above that, for me, encapsulate what it is that distinguishes them from mainstream contemporary analytic philosophy, and indicates the reason why I think it’s crucial to
pay attention to these voices. Enjoy!
If I am right about the character of the philosophical anxieties I aim to deal with, there is no room for doubt that engaging in “constructive philosophy”… is not the way to approach them. As I have put it, we need to exorcize the questions rather than set about answering them. Of course that takes hard work: if you like, constructive philosophy in another sense.
—John McDowell, Mind and World
“Ordinary language philosophy”… seeks to alleviate philosophical entanglements and obscurities by means of consideration of the ordinary and normal uses of philosophers’ words, and the worldly conditions that make those uses possible and give them their specific significance.
—Avner Baz, When Worlds Are Called For
When philosophers use a word—”knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name”—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its original home?— What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §116
Our most profound confusions of soul show themselves in—and can be revealed to us through an attention to—our confusions concerning what we mean (and, in particular, what we fail to mean) by our words.
—James Conant, “Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein”
Attention to the details of cases as they arise may not provide a quick path to an all-embracing system; but at least it promises genuine instead of spurious clarity.
—Stanley Cavell, “Must We Mean What We Say?”
[NB: For those wondering, I gave this post an incredibly pretentious title because: a) I like pretentious titles, b) it gives me an excuse to
encourage you to go read a brilliant piece of epistemology which also has the virtue of having a wonderfully pretentious title: Duncan Pritchard’s article “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism“, c) I’m shamelessly trying to snag some Google search results for ordinary language philosophy and Wittgenstein.]
[[EDIT: for some reason, the formatting of this post went totally haywire, and I’ve only just realised this and managed to address it. Apologies if you read it whilst the formatting made it nearly unreadable!]]